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OPINION OF THE COURT 
__________ 
 
KRAUSE, Circuit Judge. 
This case presents an issue of first impression for this 
Circuit and of great importance to the healthcare industry: 
What remedies are available to an out-of-network healthcare 
provider when an insurer agrees to pay for the provision of 
services that are not otherwise available in-network and then 
reneges on that promise?  To frame the question in statutory 
terms, in what circumstances does section 514(a) of the 
Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 (ERISA), 
29 U.S.C. § 1001, et seq., which preempts state laws that 
“relate to” ERISA plans, preempt an out-of-network provider 
from pursuing common law breach of contract, promissory 
estoppel, and unjust enrichment claims?  The District Court 
held the provider’s claims here were preempted.  We disagree 
as to the breach of contract and promissory estoppel claims, so 











Aetna2 is an insurer for healthcare plans offered by various 
employers.  Employees of two of those employers—J.L. and 
D.W.—had plans that did not authorize coverage of out-of-
network services under normal circumstances: J.L.’s plan 
provided out-of-network benefits only in cases of “Urgent Care 
or a medical Emergency,”3 JA 239, and the procedure J.L. 
 
1 We draw this background from the allegations in the 
Center’s first amended complaint in J.L.’s case and proposed 
second amended complaint in D.W.’s case, which we accept as 
true at the motion to dismiss stage.  See Menkes v. Prudential 
Ins. Co. of Am., 762 F.3d 285, 287 (3d Cir. 2014).   
 
2 Aetna Health Inc. and Aetna Life Insurance Company are 
J.L.’s and D.W.’s plan administrators, respectively.  We refer 
to them collectively as Aetna, the insureds’ plan administrator, 
or the insurer.  
 
3 “Urgent Care” and “Emergency” are defined terms in 
J.L.’s plan.  Emergency is defined as: 
 
A medical condition manifesting itself by acute 
symptoms of sufficient severity including, but not 
limited to, severe pain, psychiatric disturbances and/or 
symptoms of Substance Abuse such that a prudent 
layperson, who possesses an average knowledge of 
health and medicine, could expect the absence of 
immediate medical attention to result in: placing the 
health of the individual . . . in serious jeopardy; serious 
impairment to bodily functions; or serious dysfunction 







required fell into neither category, and D.W.’s plan did not 
provide out-of-network benefits at all.   
 
As it turned out, however, both J.L. and D.W. required 
medical procedures that were not available in-network.  J.L. 
needed bilateral breast reconstruction surgery following a 
double mastectomy, and there were no in-network physicians 
available to perform the procedure.  D.W. required facial 
reanimation surgery—a niche procedure performed by only a 
handful of surgeons in the United States.  Both insureds were 
therefore referred for treatment to the Plastic Surgery Center, a 
New Jersey medical practice specializing in plastic and 
reconstructive surgery.  As an out-of-network provider, 
however, the Center was concerned about how it would be 
compensated, so before agreeing to provide care, the Center 
contacted Aetna to confirm that it would make payment.   
 
Aetna agreed.  In J.L.’s case, “Aetna contracted with [the 
Center] to provide multi-stage breast reconstruction surgery to 
J.L., along with related medical services, and to pay [the 
Center] a reasonable amount for those services according to the 
terms of the Plan.”  JA 201–02.  This agreement was struck 
during telephone conversations between Aetna and Center 
employees.  In D.W.’s case, as documented in various 
contemporaneous notes, a Center employee initially asked 
Aetna for a one-off “single case agreement” with a negotiated 
rate of payment, but reported back: “(Aetna is stating they 
 
 
JA 223.  Urgent Care is “[c]are for a non-life threatening 









don’t neg an[y]4 longer it would be paid at the highest 
in[-]network level) however I will still attempt to get approval 
for neg payment based on no available providers.”  JA 65, 67 
(capitalization altered).  The notes next reflect that an Aetna 
employee called the Center back to confirm that Aetna “agreed 
to approve and pay for” D.W.’s surgery and to provide 
payment at the “highest in[-]network level.”  JA 59.  Pursuant 
to these alleged oral agreements that “[the Center] and Aetna 
entered” in each case, the Center then provided the specified 
services “[i]n exchange for,” respectively, payment of a 
“reasonable amount” and at the “highest in[-]network level” 
under the plans.  JA 60, 204.   
 
Once the Center performed the procedures, however, Aetna 
allegedly refused to live up to its end of the bargain.  Of the 
$292,742 the Center billed for J.L.’s services, Aetna paid only 
$95,534.04.5  Of the $420,750 the Center billed for D.W.’s 
services, Aetna paid only $40,230.32.  In both cases Aetna 
declined to pay the Center anything for some services and paid 
 
4 This word appears to be “ant” in the notes.  JA 65 
(capitalization altered).  For present purposes, we assume that 
this was merely a typo, but should it become clear with the 
benefit of discovery that “ant” has an independent meaning, 
that may factor into the District Court’s consideration of any 
motion for summary judgment that Aetna may choose to bring. 
    
5 Part of J.L.’s procedure was performed by the Center at 
an Ambulatory Surgery Center and Aetna paid that facility 
$9,271.89.  It is not apparent on the face of the complaint 
whether that payment was separate from or part of Aetna’s 








less than it allegedly agreed to for others, so the Center brought 
suit in New Jersey, claiming breach of contract, unjust 
enrichment, and promissory estoppel.  Aetna moved to dismiss 
the claims as expressly preempted by section 514(a) or, 
alternatively, for failure to state a claim.  In D.W.’s case, the 
Center then cross-moved to file a second amended complaint.  
The District Court granted Aetna’s motion to dismiss in both 
cases, holding that section 514(a) expressly preempted all 
claims and, accordingly, denied the Center’s motion to amend 
in D.W.’s case as futile.  The Center timely appealed.   
  
II. JURISDICTION AND STANDARD OF REVIEW 
 
The District Court had jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1332, 
and we have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291.  We review 
a dismissal on ERISA preemption grounds de novo, see 
Menkes v. Prudential Ins. Co. of Am., 762 F.3d 285, 289 (3d 
Cir. 2014), and we will affirm if, accepting the veracity of 
factual allegations in the complaint and drawing all reasonable 
inferences in the plaintiff’s favor, the plaintiff failed to plead 
“enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its 
face,”  Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007); 




Defining the contours of ERISA’s express preemption 
provision is a nettlesome task.  To frame the particular inquiry 
here, we review, first, the statutory backdrop for our decision 
and, second, relevant developments in the healthcare industry.  









 A. Statutory Background 
 
In 1974, in response to mounting public discontent with a 
pension system that often failed to provide employees with 
promised benefits, Congress enacted ERISA, which set forth 
uniform federal standards for not only pension plans, but also 
welfare plans—a class of benefit plans in which J.L.’s and 
D.W.’s healthcare plans fall.6  Pub. L. No. 93-406, 88 Stat. 829, 
as amended, 29 U.S.C. § 1001 et seq.; see Massachusetts v. 
Morash, 490 U.S. 107, 112–13 (1989); DiFelice v. Aetna U.S. 
Healthcare, 346 F.3d 442, 454 (3d Cir. 2003) (Becker, J., 
concurring).  ERISA’s stated goal was “to promote the 
interests of employees and their beneficiaries in employee 
benefit plans” by ensuring benefit plans were well managed 
and would not leave plan participants short-changed.  Shaw v. 
Delta Air Lines, Inc., 463 U.S. 85, 90 (1983); see also 
29 U.S.C. § 1001(b).  To achieve this goal, ERISA “impose[d] 
participation, funding, and vesting requirements on pension 
plans” and “set[] various uniform standards, including rules 
concerning reporting, disclosure, and fiduciary responsibility, 
for both pension and welfare plans.”  Shaw, 463 U.S. at 91. 
 
 
6 Pension plans “provide[] income deferral or retirement 
income,” while welfare plans “provide[] benefits for 
contingencies such as illness, accident, disability, death, or 
unemployment.”  Shaw v. Delta Air Lines, Inc., 463 U.S. 85, 
91 n.5 (1983) (citing 29 U.S.C. § 1002(1), (2), (3)).  ERISA 
governs “any employee benefit plan if it is established or 
maintained . . . by any employer engaged in commerce,” 
29 U.S.C. § 1003(a), and on appeal neither party disputes that 








These rules protect plan “participants,”7 i.e., employees 
eligible to receive benefits under the plan, and “beneficiaries,”8 
i.e., individuals designated by participants or the terms of the 
plan to receive benefits.  For example, plans are required to 
share information about benefits with participants and 
beneficiaries, and to provide the Secretary of Labor with an 
annual report on the plan’s financial health.  See 29 U.S.C. 
§§ 1021, 1022, 1023, 1024, 1025; Gobeille v. Liberty Mut. Ins. 
Co., 136 S. Ct. 936, 944–45 (2016) (detailing requirements).  
Those involved in the management of plans, i.e., plan 
“fiduciar[ies],”9 must also act “for the exclusive purpose of . . . 
 
7 In full, a plan “participant” is:  
[A]ny employee or former employee of an employer, or 
any member or former member of an employee 
organization, who is or may become eligible to receive 
a benefit of any type from an employee benefit plan 
which covers employees of such employer or members 
of such organization, or whose beneficiaries may be 
eligible to receive any such benefit.  
29 U.S.C. § 1002(7).   
 
8 The statute defines “beneficiary” as: “a person designated 
by a participant, or by the terms of an employee benefit plan, 
who is or may become entitled to a benefit thereunder.”  Id. 
§ 1002(8).   
 
9 An individual is a “fiduciary” of an ERISA plan “to the 
extent (i) he exercises any discretionary authority or 
discretionary control respecting management of such plan or 
exercises any authority or control respecting management or 







providing benefits to participants . . .  [and] defraying 
reasonable expenses of administering the plan.”  29 U.S.C. 
§ 1104(a)(1)(A). 
 
To provide a uniform enforcement mechanism for these 
rules and requirements and to guarantee that the cost of 
compliance would not be prohibitive, Congress also put in 
place two additional, complementary statutory provisions.  
First, it established federal causes of action under section 
502(a) that form “a carefully integrated civil enforcement 
scheme.”  Ingersoll-Rand Co. v. McClendon, 498 U.S. 133, 
137 (1990) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted).  
Section 502(a) thus created a federal cause of action for plan 
beneficiaries and participants to recover benefits due under a 
plan or to enforce the terms of the plan.  
29 U.S.C. § 1132(a)(1)(B).10  
 
fee or other compensation, direct or indirect, with respect to 
any moneys or other property of such plan, or has any authority 
or responsibility to do so, or (iii) he has any discretionary 
authority or discretionary responsibility in the administration 
of such plan.”  29 U.S.C. § 1002(21)(A).  
 
10 Although these provisions are not at issue in this case, we 
note, as relevant to ERISA preemption more generally, that the 
statute also made these the exclusive remedies available, at 
least for those parties.  Aetna Health Inc. v. Davila, 542 U.S. 
200, 209 (2004). Thus, any state law cause of action that 
“duplicates, supplements, or supplants” the remedies set forth 
in section 502(a) “conflicts with the clear congressional intent 
to make” those remedies exclusive and therefore triggers 









Second, to make clear that ERISA’s mandates supplanted 
the patchwork of state law previously in place and to ensure 
that plans were not crippled by the administrative cost of 
complying with not only ERISA, but also innumerable, 
potentially conflicting state laws, see Gobeille, 136 S. Ct. at 
943–44; Menkes, 762 F.3d at 293, Congress enacted 
section 514(a)—a broad express preemption provision, which 
“supersede[s] any and all State laws insofar as they may now 
or hereafter relate to any employee benefit plan.”  
29 U.S.C. § 1144(a); see Ingersoll-Rand, 498 U.S. at 138.  The 
scope of “[s]tate laws” that may “relate to” a plan is expansive, 
encompassing “all laws, decisions, rules, regulations, or other 
State action having the effect of law, of any State.”  29 U.S.C. 
§ 1144(c)(1).  This includes not only state statutes, but also 
common law causes of action.  See Menkes, 762 F.3d at 294. 
 
Recognizing that “[i]f ‘relate to’ were taken to extend to the 
furthest stretch of its indeterminacy, then for all practical 
purposes pre-emption would never run its course,” N.Y. State 
Conference of Blue Cross & Blue Shield Plans v. Travelers Ins. 
Co., 514 U.S. 645, 655 (1995), the Supreme Court has sought 
to craft a functional test for express preemption, instructing 
that a state law “relates to” an employee benefit plan if it has 
either (1) a “reference to” or (2) a “connection with” that plan, 
Shaw, 463 U.S. at 96–97.  The first applies “[w]here a State’s 
law acts immediately and exclusively upon ERISA plans . . . 
or where the existence of ERISA plans is essential to the law’s 
operation.”  Gobeille, 136 S. Ct. at 943 (alternations in 
original) (citation omitted).  The second covers state laws that 
“govern[] . . . a central matter of plan administration or 
interfere[] with nationally uniform plan administration,” and 







effects [that] force an ERISA plan to adopt a certain scheme of 
substantive coverage or effectively restrict its choice of 
insurers.”  Id. (second alteration in original) (internal 
quotations marks and citations omitted).  The latter inquiry is 
guided by “the objectives of the ERISA statute,” which provide 
a blueprint for “the scope of the state law that Congress 
understood would survive.”  Id. (citation omitted). 
 
With this statutory background in mind, we turn to 
developments in the healthcare industry that give rise to the 
Center’s claims in this case.  
 
 B. Relevant Developments in the Healthcare  
  Profession11 
 
At the core of modern developments in welfare plan 
structure are two competing values: choice and cost.  
Historically, doctors in the United States worked on a “fee-for-
service” basis.  Pegram v. Herdrich, 530 U.S. 211, 218 (2000).  
Doctors established set fee schedules for their services and 
treated patients in accordance with their best judgment, billing 
 
11 We provide only a brief overview of the emergence of 
managed care as relevant to a basic understanding of the role 
of out-of-network providers in that setting and the different 
payment methods that pertain to this category of providers.  A 
comprehensive treatment of the subject, to which we do not 
aspire here, can be found in Paul Starr’s Pulitzer Prize-winning 
book The Social Transformation of American Medicine.  See 
generally Paul Starr, The Social Transformation of American 
Medicine: The Rise of a Sovereign Profession and the Making 








either the patient or an insurer for the costs of services after 
they were provided.  See id.  The incentive under this system 
generally was for healthcare providers to provide patients with 
“more care, not less,” but that, in turn, gave rise to concerns 
about mounting healthcare costs that outstripped the value of 
care provided.  Id.  Responding to a perceived need to cut costs, 
starting in the 1960s and continuing through today, welfare 
plans increasingly shifted to “managed care” models of 
healthcare, epitomized by Health Maintenance Organizations 
(HMOs) and Preferred Provider Organizations (PPOs).  Id. at 
218–19; see also DiFelice, 346 F.3d at 464 (Becker, J., 
concurring); J. Scott Andresen, Is Utilization Review the 
Practice of Medicine?, Implications for Managed Care 
Administrators, 19 J. Legal Med. 431, 431 & n.6 (1998).   
 
Managed care organizations aim to reduce healthcare costs 
without sacrificing quality of care by creating networks of 
doctors or preferred providers who enter into provider 
agreements with set fee arrangements and agree to adhere to 
certain cost-cutting measures in exchange for a steady stream 
of patients.12  See, e.g., CardioNet, Inc. v. Cigna Health Corp., 
 
12 Perceived tension between the goals of cost effectiveness 
and quality of care has spawned a robust debate over the merits 
of managed care.  See, e.g., Kent G. Rutter, Note, 
Democratizing HMO Regulation to Enforce the “Rule of 
Rescue,” 30 U. Mich. J.L. Reform 147, 154 (1996) (explaining 
that proponents of managed care “maintain that their plans 
reduce health care costs by cutting waste and by avoiding 
serious illness through an emphasis on preventative care” 
while critics contend that the “cost-reducing techniques” harm 
the quality of care by “deny[ing] patients the ‘medically 







751 F.3d 165, 168–69 (3d Cir. 2014) (describing provider 
agreement); Pascack Valley Hosp., Inc. v. Local 464 A UFCW 
Welfare Reimbursement Plan, 388 F.3d 393, 402–03 (3d Cir. 
2004) (citing Blue Cross of Cal. v. Anesthesia Care Assocs. 
Med. Grp., Inc., 187 F.3d 1045, 1050–54 (9th Cir. 1999)) 
(same); see also Gregory F. Jacob, A Pox on Both Their 
Houses: North Cypress Med. Ctr. Op. Co., Ltd. v. Aetna Life 
Ins. Co., 26 ERISA Litig. Rep., Nov. 2018 (describing the 
bargain in-network providers strike: “reduced compensation” 
in exchange for “increased patient volume”).  These 
organizations, in essence, restrict an individual’s choice of 
healthcare providers in exchange for access to and cost 
effectiveness of the healthcare they provide.  
 
In striving for efficiency, managed care organizations have 
a strong incentive simultaneously to bring providers in-
network, which over time increases the network’s bargaining 
power, and to reduce unexpected charges from out-of-network 
providers, whose billing practices may vary significantly from 
those of in-network providers.  See Am. Orthopedic & Sports 
Med. v. Indep. Blue Cross Blue Shield, 890 F.3d 445, 452 (3d 
Cir. 2018).  To achieve these interlocking goals, many plans, 
including J.L.’s and D.W.’s, restrict or discourage the use of 
out-of-network providers.  See Kent G. Rutter, Note, 
Democratizing HMO Regulation to Enforce the “Rule of 
Rescue,” 30 U. Mich. J.L. Reform 147, 150 (1996).  But as 
apparent in the consolidated cases before us, in-network 
providers are not always able to meet an individual’s 
healthcare needs, and in other cases, an individual may seek 
 
(citation omitted)).  The merits of that evolving debate are 








out-of-network care either unwittingly or out of necessity.  
These circumstances raise one of the questions at the core of 
this case:  Must out-of-network providers seek payment from 
patients upfront, or are there viable alternative avenues to 
secure compensation for services provided?  
 
Until recently, one oft-traveled avenue has been the 
“assignment of benefits,” allowing the provider to submit 
claims to and receive payment directly from insurers in the 
patient’s stead.  See CardioNet, 751 F.3d at 179 (citation 
omitted).  Assignments became commonplace because only 
plan “participant[s]” and “beneficiar[ies],” not healthcare 
providers, are expressly authorized to bring section 502(a) 
causes of action.  29 U.S.C. § 1132(a)(1)(B); see Pascack 
Valley Hosp., 388 F.3d at 400; see also DB Healthcare, LLC v. 
Blue Cross Blue Shield of Ariz., Inc., 852 F.3d 868, 875 (9th 
Cir. 2017) (collecting cases).  But a valid assignment allows a 
healthcare provider to stand in the shoes of the “participant” or 
“beneficiary” and thereby to obtain not only the right to 
benefits due under the plan, but also the capacity to bring suit 
for non-payment under section 502(a).  See N. Jersey Brain & 
Spine Ctr. v. Aetna, Inc., 801 F.3d 369, 372–73 (3d Cir. 2015); 
CardioNet, 751 F.3d at 176 n.10.  Thus, for a time, 
practitioners, almost universally, obtained assignments of 
benefits from patients.  Am. Orthopedic & Sports Med., 890 
F.3d at 451.   
 
Not so in recent years.  To curtail this new fount of section 
502(a) litigation, decrease their exposure to out-of-network 
claims, and encourage providers to come in network, insurers 
began inserting anti-assignment provisions in plans.  Id. at 450.  
Anti-assignment provisions place out-of-network providers in 







directly” and, should payment not be forthcoming, of having 
either to “rely on the beneficiary to maintain an ERISA suit” 
or to sue the beneficiary directly.  CardioNet, 751 F.3d at 179 
(citation omitted).  Neither option for recouping compensation 
is likely to optimize resources or be good for business.  See Am. 
Orthopedic & Sports Med., 890 F.3d at 451.  Nonetheless, as a 
matter of federal common law, we recently joined our sister 
circuits in holding that anti-assignment provisions, like other 
unambiguous terms in a contract, are enforceable.  See id. at 
453.  While we left open the possibility that a patient could 
grant her provider a valid power of attorney to pursue claims 
for benefits on her behalf, see id. at 454–55, for most out-of-
network providers, the rising prevalence of anti-assignment 
provisions signals the proverbial end of the road for relief 
under section 502(a).  The anti-assignment provision in D.W.’s 
plan is emblematic of this trend.    
 
In response, out-of-network providers like the Center have 
attempted to secure a new foothold—a promise of payment 
from the insurer in advance of any services.  And that, in turn, 
has given rise to a different class of claims for non-payment—
common law claims like those here, including for breach of 
contract, unjust enrichment, and promissory estoppel.  Aetna 
does not dispute that such claims would not be preempted if 
they sought to enforce a “single standalone agreement” that 
made no mention of the plan and explicitly identified the 
discrete services to be performed and the “dollar amount” for 
those services.  Oral Arg. Tr. at 35–36.  In that circumstance, 
Aetna concedes, the claims would not “relate to” an ERISA 
plan but to a freestanding contract, and they would seek not to 
recoup benefits due under the terms of the plan, but to enforce 
obligations that arose out of an oral promise of payment made 







Mem’l Hosp. Sys. v. Northbrook Life Ins. Co., 904 F.2d 236, 
246 (5th Cir. 1990).13  To put a fine point on it, those claims 
could not be brought under section 502(a), even by J.L. or 
D.W., because Aetna’s alleged liability would flow not from 
the plans, but from an independent agreement reached between 
the Center and Aetna to which neither J.L. nor D.W. was a 
party.  See Access Mediquip L.L.C. v. UnitedHealthcare Ins. 
Co., 662 F.3d 376, 383, 385–86 (5th Cir.), rehearing en banc 
granted, 678 F.3d 940 (5th Cir.), opinion reinstated, 698 F.3d 
229 (5th Cir. 2012) (en banc); Hospice of Metro Denver, Inc. 
v. Grp. Health Ins. of Okla., Inc., 944 F.2d 752, 754, 756 (10th 
Cir. 1991); Mem’l Hosp., 904 F.2d at 250.   
 
And here we come to the crux of the problem.  As out-of-
network providers migrate from accepting assignment of plan 
benefits from the insured to forming their own agreements with 
the insurers, many have not yet developed a standard form of 
contract.14  Instead, as borne out in the case before us, they 
 
13 See also In Home Health, Inc. v. Prudential Ins. Co. of 
Am., 101 F.3d 600, 605–06 (8th Cir. 1996); Meadows v. 
Emp’rs Health Ins., 47 F.3d 1006, 1010 (9th Cir. 1995); 
Hospice of Metro Denver, Inc. v. Grp. Health Ins. of Okla., 
Inc., 944 F.2d 752, 754–55 (10th Cir. 1991). 
 
14 It is odd indeed that a pre-service agreement that sets 
forth the services to be provided alongside the dollar amounts 
to be paid is not yet common practice for out-of-network 
providers, particularly where a given provider operates as a 
large-scale, sophisticated business entity, as it would provide 
both parties with clarity and avoid the thicket of issues we find 








enter into ad hoc arrangements in which the provider agrees to 
render services (which are not covered by the terms of the plan) 
in exchange for a promise of payment by the insurer.  But for 
those payment terms, as here, the parties sometimes default to 
the rate of payment under the plan.  And that default resurrects 
the question of whether a subsequent claim for nonpayment 
then “relate[s] to” the plan and is therefore preempted after all.  
To that preemption question, we now turn. 
 
 C. The Center’s Breach of Contract and   
  Promissory Estoppel Claims 
As we confront this case at the motion to dismiss stage, the 
parameters of our analysis are shaped by our standard of 
review, and we must let the Center’s claims proceed if, 
“accept[ing] all factual allegations in the complaint as true and 
draw[ing] all reasonable inferences” in the Center’s favor, we 
find it has stated a claim “that is plausible on its face.”  Menkes, 
762 F.3d at 290 (citation omitted).  As explained below, the 
Center has plausibly pleaded breach of contract and 
promissory estoppel claims that do not “relate to” ERISA plans 
under either of the two definitions: (1) the causes of action do 
not require impermissible “reference to” ERISA plans because 
they are not claims for benefits due under an ERISA plan and 
are not otherwise premised on ERISA plans; and (2) the claims 
do not have a “connection with” ERISA plans because they do 
not arise out of a relationship ERISA intended to govern, 
because they do not “interfere[] with nationally uniform plan 
administration,” and because holding these claims preempted 








1.  The Center’s contract and promissory estoppel 
claims as pleaded do not require impermissible 
“reference to” ERISA plans 
Courts have devised a variety of formulations for the types 
of claims that make impermissible “reference to” ERISA plans.  
The Supreme Court has defined this class of claims to include 
not only those that “act[] immediately and exclusively upon 
ERISA plans,” Gobeille, 136 S. Ct. at 943 (citation omitted), 
but also, as relevant here, those “premised on” the plan,15 
Ingersoll-Rand, 498 U.S. at 140.  And claims in this second 
category, it has described variously as claims “where the 
existence of ERISA plans is essential to the law’s operation,” 
Gobeille, 136 S. Ct. at 943 (citation omitted); where the 
“court’s inquiry must be directed to the plan,” Ingersoll-Rand, 
498 U.S. at 140; where “the existence of [an ERISA] plan is a 
 
15 We treat the “premised on” test as a subset of the inquiry 
into whether a state law has an impermissible “reference to” 
ERISA plans, consistent with Supreme Court precedent.  See 
Gobeille, 136 S. Ct. at 943 (defining “reference to” as covering 
those state laws that act “immediately and exclusively upon 
ERISA plans . . . or where the existence of ERISA plans is 
essential to the law’s operation” (alteration in original) 
(citation omitted)); Cal. Div. of Labor Standards Enf’t v. 
Dillingham Constr., N.A., 519 U.S. 316, 324–25 (1997) 
(concluding that “common-law cause[s] of action premised on 
the existence of an ERISA plan” are preempted under the 
“reference to” inquiry); cf. Nat’l Sec. Sys., Inc. v. Iola, 700 F.3d 
65, 83–84 (3d Cir. 2012) (holding that claims “premised on” 
an ERISA plan have “a connection with or reference to such a 








critical factor in establishing liability,” id. at 139–40; and 
where “there simply is no cause of action if there is no plan,” 
id. at 140.  
 
From these variegated formulations we distill two 
overlapping categories of claims “premised on” ERISA plans: 
(a) claims predicated on the plan or plan administration, e.g., 
claims for benefits due under a plan, Menkes, 762 F.3d at 296 
(citing Pilot Life Insurance Co. v. Dedeaux, 481 U.S. 41, 47–
48 (1987)); Kollman v. Hewitt Assocs., LLC, 487 F.3d 139, 150 
(3d Cir. 2007), or where the plan “is a critical factor in 
establishing liability,” Ingersoll-Rand, 498 U.S. at 139–40; 
accord De Buono v. NYSA-ILA Med. & Clinical Servs. Fund, 
520 U.S. 806, 815 & n.14 (1997); and (b) claims that “involve 
construction of [the] plan[],” 1975 Salaried Retirement Plan 
for Eligible Emps. of Crucible, Inc. v. Nobers, 968 F.2d 401, 
406 (3d Cir. 1992), or “require interpreting the plan’s terms,” 
Menkes, 762 F.3d at 294.  Below we address: (a) whether the 
breach of contract and promissory estoppel claims plausibly 
seek to enforce obligations independent of the plans rather than 
claims for benefits due under the plans or claims otherwise 
impermissibly tethered to the plans; (b) whether the claims as 
pleaded require impermissible construction or interpretation of 
the plans; and (c) Aetna’s arguments in support of preemption.  
   
a. The claims plausibly seek to enforce 
obligations independent of the plan  
 
Whether the Center seeks to enforce obligations 
independent of the plan turns on whether the parties agreed (i) 
that Aetna would provide payment for all services necessary to 
perform the respective surgeries, leaving only the amount of 







of coverage, as well as payment, would be limited to the terms 
of the plans—leaving open the possibility that some services 
would not be compensated at all.   
 
Aetna argues the latter, relying on Pilot Life Insurance Co. 
v. Dedeaux, 481 U.S. 41, 48 (1987), Menkes, 762 F.3d at 295–
96, and Kollman, 487 F.3d at 150.  But those cases are 
inapposite.  The common law claims in each were brought by 
plan participants or beneficiaries, alleging either that the 
insurer or plan administrator, or an agent thereof, had 
improperly processed or misrepresented the benefits due under 
the plan.  Pilot Life, 481 U.S. at 43–44, 48; Menkes, 762 F.3d 
at 294–96; Kollman, 487 F.3d at 150.  Those plaintiffs sought 
to enforce legal obligations flowing from the four corners of 
their ERISA plans.     
 
The claims here, on the other hand, arose precisely because 
there was no coverage under the plans for services performed 
by an out-of-network provider like the Center.  In contrast to 
in-network providers whose relationship with Aetna is 
governed by a provider agreement that typically cross-
references the ERISA plan and limits payment to “covered 
services,” defined as those claims recognized as “medically 
necessary” under the terms of the relevant ERISA plan, see, 
e.g., Lone Star OB/GYN Assocs. v. Aetna Health Inc., 579 F.3d 
525, 530 (5th Cir. 2009), out-of-network providers do not have 
pre-existing contractual relationships with the insurer.  Thus, 
absent a separate agreement between Aetna and the Center, 
there was no obligation for the Center to provide services to 
the plan participants, no obligation for Aetna to pay the Center 







limited to benefits covered under the plan.16  And the 
complaints allege such separate agreements here:  As pleaded, 
the parties agreed that the Center would perform the surgeries 
and related medical care in exchange for payment from Aetna 
of a “reasonable amount” under J.L.’s plan and at the “highest 
in[-]network level” under D.W.’s plan for all component 
services (not merely those services covered under the terms of 
the plan).  JA 59, 201–02.   
 
 
16 We offer no opinion on the circumstances in which in-
network providers could bring state law claims for breach of 
contract arising out of the provider agreement or an equitable 
cause of action, such as promissory estoppel or quantum 
meruit, arising out of an insurer’s promise of payment without 
running afoul of section 514(a), which would depend on the 
content of the claims and the terms of the provider agreement.  
See, e.g., Pascack, 388 F.3d at 403; Kolbe & Kolbe Health & 
Welfare Benefit Plan v. Med. Coll. of Wis., Inc., 657 F.3d 496, 
504–05 (7th Cir. 2011); Lone Star, 579 F.3d at 530; Blue Cross, 
187 F.3d at 1050–54.  Nor do we suggest that out-of-network 
providers are categorically exempt from section 514(a), with 
carte blanche to file suit for services rendered to plan 
participants.  See, e.g., Access Mediquip, 662 F.3d at 386–87 
(holding section 514(a) preempts unjust enrichment and 
quantum meruit claims premised on obligations imposed by 
ERISA plans rather than an independent promise of payment).  
Whether any agreement was reached with a provider, and the 
extent to which the terms of that agreement are so intertwined 
with the plan as to “relate to” an ERISA plan, are questions that 








Aetna’s argument that the Center agreed to be bound by all 
terms and conditions of the plan—in effect, that it agreed to be 
paid as if it were an in-network provider—is simply not 
apparent on the face of the pleadings.  In the case of J.L., the 
Center alleges that “Aetna contracted with [the Center] to 
provide multi-stage breast reconstruction surgery to J.L., along 
with related medical services, and to pay [the Center] a 
reasonable amount for those services according to the terms of 
the Plan.”  JA 201–02.  Accepting the pleadings as true and 
drawing all inferences in the Center’s favor, as we must at the 
motion to dismiss stage, we conclude that only the amount of 
payment and not the scope of services was to be determined in 
accordance with the terms of the plan; the services agreed to 
be compensated were all those required to perform J.L.’s 
procedure.   
  
The same holds true in D.W.’s case.  We may reasonably 
infer from notes attached to the complaint that the Center 
identified at least eighteen distinct CPT17 codes associated with 
D.W.’s surgery; the Center also alleges that a Center employee 
faxed D.W.’s clinical information to Aetna, requesting a 
“single case agreement” and was assured that if Aetna agreed 
to pay for the procedure it would instead pay the Center “at the 
highest in[-]network level,” JA 65, 67 (capitalization altered); 
and the Center alleges that an Aetna employee subsequently 
called the Center to confirm that Aetna “had agreed to approve 
 
17 “CPT” stands for “Current Procedural Terminology” and 
is defined in D.W.’s plan as “the most recent edition of an 
annually revised listing published by the American Medical 
Association which assigns numerical codes to procedures and 








and pay” for the procedure, JA 59.  These allegations plausibly 
support the inference that Aetna agreed to pay for all 
component services of D.W.’s surgery at the highest in-
network level.  
  
Aetna points to other evidence supporting a contrary 
inference.  For example, it highlights the portion of the notes 
reflecting that it “do[es]n’t neg[otiate] [single case agreements] 
an[y] longer,” JA 65 (capitalization altered), and the language 
in its precertification letter18—which was addressed to D.W. 
 
18 The same day Aetna allegedly confirmed to the Center 
that it had approved D.W.’s surgery and would make payment 
at the “highest in[-]network level,” Aetna also sent the Center 
a copy of a precertification letter, addressed to its insured, 
D.W., identifying fourteen services that had been approved.  
JA 59.  The letter stated, among other things, that “[y]our plan 
does not have out-of-network benefits”; that coverage for the 
fourteen services was “approved, subject to the requirements 
of this letter”; and that approval was “at an in-network benefit 
level,” subject to “any applicable dollar limits.”  Defs.’ Mot. to 
Dismiss Ex. 2, ECF No. 12-2, at 1, 7–8.  It also advised that 
reimbursement would “be based on standard coding and 
bundling logic and any mutually agreed upon contracted or 
negotiated rates, subject to any and all copays or coinsurance 
requirements”; that D.W. would “be responsible . . .  for in-
network cost-sharing requirements”; and that D.W. “should 
refer to the plan document to determine exclusions and 
limitations under the plan.”  Id. at 1, 7.  Though the 
precertification letter is extraneous to the pleadings, we 
consider it because it is integral to the pleadings.  See Angstadt 
v. Midd-W. Sch. Dist., 377 F.3d 338, 342 (3d Cir. 2004). 







but also copied to the Center—stating that “the member’s 
eligibility for coverage under the plan [has been verified]” and 
that reimbursement would be based on “standard coding and 
bundling logic and any mutually agreed upon contracted or 
negotiated rates,” Defs.’ Mot. to Dismiss Ex. 2, ECF No. 12-2, 
at 1, 7.  From this evidence, Aetna argues we may plausibly 
infer that the agreement was for the benefits and not merely the 
rate of payment set forth in the plan.  Be that as it may, it does 
not render the Center’s inferences implausible:  The notes go 
on to document other statements supporting the Center’s 
position, and Aetna concedes the precertification letter was 
drafted not for the benefit of the Center, but for the benefit of 
its insured, D.W. 
 
In short, even assuming a different inference is also 
plausible, at the motion to dismiss stage, we must view the 
allegations in the light most favorable to the Center and draw 
all reasonable inferences in the Center’s favor.  When we do 
so, the claims as pleaded are not for benefits due under the 
plans.  Nor are the claims otherwise impermissibly predicated 
on the plan or plan administration.  Because, as alleged, it is 
Aetna’s oral offers or oral promises (as the case may be) rather 
than the terms of the plan that define the scope of Aetna’s duty, 
the plans are not “critical factor[s] in establishing liability.”19  
See Ingersoll-Rand, 498 U.S. at 139–40.   
 
19 To establish its breach of contract claims, the Center may 
put forth evidence of oral offers and acceptances giving rise to 
non-plan-based duties, see Williams v. Vito, 838 A.2d 556, 560 
(N.J. Super. Ct. Law. Div. 2003) (“[A]bsent a statute to the 
contrary, an oral offer and acceptance constitutes a binding 
agreement . . . .”), and evidence of its performance as valuable 








b. The claims as pleaded do not require 
interpretation or construction of ERISA plans 
 
Expounding on the scope of this class of preempted claims, 
we have clarified that a claim that “turns largely on legal duties 
generated outside the ERISA context,” and “requires only a 
cursory examination of the plan” is “not the sort of exacting, 
tedious, or duplicative inquiry that the preemption doctrine is 
intended to bar.”  Iola, 700 F.3d at 85 (internal quotation marks 
and citation omitted).   
 
Aetna argues that the Center’s claims are so enmeshed with 
the plans as to require interpretation or construction of the 
plans.  But assuming the Center can establish an agreement to 
pay for all component services, it is not apparent from the 
pleadings why more than a cursory review of either J.L.’s or 
D.W.’s plan would be required to establish “a reasonable 
amount . . . according to the terms of the Plan,” JA 201–02, or 
the “highest in[-]network level,” JA 59, for each service. 
 
 
Sandvik, Inc., 800 A.2d 872, 878–79 (N.J. 2002) (citation 
omitted); see also Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 71 
(1981).  The same holds true for the promissory estoppel 
claims.  As alleged, the plans are not “critical,” De Buono, 520 
U.S. at 815, to the demonstration of “(1) a clear and definite 
promise; (2) made with the expectation that the promisee will 
rely on it; (3) reasonable reliance; and (4) definite and 
substantial detriment,” Toll Bros., Inc. v. Bd. of Chosen 








In neither its briefing nor at oral argument did Aetna 
explain why these determinations of in-network payment rates 
would be particularly complex or require careful study of the 
intricacies of the plans.  To the contrary, the reasonable 
inference from the pleadings is that, consistent with 
representations Aetna has made in other cases, the 
determination is as simple as checking the “usual, customary, 
and reasonable (‘UCR’) rate . . . based on an industry-standard 
schedule” for the services in question, see, e.g., McCulloch 
Orthopaedic Surgical Servs., PLLC v. Aetna Inc., 857 F.3d 
141, 144 (2d Cir. 2017), or reviewing the fee schedule attached 
to Aetna’s in-network provider agreements, see Lone Star, 579 
F.3d at 530.  The former would be precisely the type of 
“cursory examination of the plan” that we have held does not 
trigger express preemption, see Iola, 700 F.3d at 85, and the 
latter would not require any examination of the plan, but only 
of the fee schedule Aetna uses with its providers, see Kolbe & 
Kolbe Health & Welfare Benefit Plan v. Med. Coll. of Wis., 
Inc., 657 F.3d 496, 504–05 (7th Cir. 2011).  Such inquiries do 
not entail “the sort of exacting, tedious, or duplicative inquiry 
that the preemption doctrine is intended to bar.”  Iola, 700 F.3d 
at 85.    
 
c. Aetna’s counterarguments 
 
Aetna offers essentially two counterarguments.  Neither is 
persuasive.  
  
First, it contends that any reference to an ERISA plan in the 
calculation of damages—no matter the degree of examination 
required—triggers express preemption.  But that argument is 
belied by Iola, where we held that misrepresentation claims 







plan were not preempted even though establishment of those 
claims, and in turn the court’s assessment of damages, 
“require[d] . . . a cursory examination of the plan provisions,” 
including “whether the representations . . . were at odds with 
the plan itself, or with the plaintiffs’ understanding of the 
benefits afforded by the plans.”  700 F.3d at 85.  Likewise, the 
Center’s core contention—that oral promises of payment 
induced it to act to its detriment—and the proof that would be 
required involve, at most, only a “cursory examination” of plan 
provisions “turn[ing] largely on legal duties generated outside 
the ERISA context.”  Id. (internal quotation marks and citation 
omitted).20    
 
Second, Aetna argues that the Center’s claims are premised 
on ERISA plans because the plans required preapproval of 
 
20 The sole authority on which Aetna relies, Nobers, is also 
readily distinguishable.  Nobers held common law claims 
preempted because the calculation of damages required 
“construction of [an] ERISA plan[].”  968 F.2d at 406.  But the 
Nobers plaintiffs were a class of employees who alleged that 
“they [sh]ould have received substantially greater pension and 
related benefits,” id. at 404, assessing damages therefore would 
have required benefit calculations that “sit[] within the 
heartland of ERISA,” Iola, 700 F.3d at 84; see Kollman, 487 
F.3d at 149–50.  The Center, on the other hand, does not allege 
that Aetna’s liability flows from its promise to provide J.L. and 
D.W. benefits under their ERISA plans; it alleges “a separate 
promise that references various [ERISA] benefit plans, none of 
which directly applies to [the Center] by its terms, as a means 
of establishing the value of that promise,” Stevenson v. Bank of 








J.L.’s and D.W.’s surgeries.  Aetna places great weight on this 
point, presumably because before concluding that an out-of-
network provider’s state law claims were not completely 
preempted by section 502(a),21 the Second Circuit in 
McCulloch observed that the provider “was not required by the 
plan to pre-approve coverage for the surgeries that he 
performed.”  857 F.3d at 150–51.  Of course, we are not bound 
by this out-of-circuit precedent, but Aetna misapprehends it in 
any event.   
 
In context, the McCulloch court was contrasting a prior 
case where it had found that the preapproval required of in-
network providers under the plan was “inextricably intertwined 
with the interpretation of Plan coverage and benefits,” 
Montefiore Med. Ctr. v. Teamsters Local 272, 642 F.3d 321, 
330, 332 (2d Cir. 2011); see McCulloch, 857 F.3d at 150–51.  
Moreover, the court went on to explain that when it came to 
out-of-network providers, the ERISA plan imposed a duty only 
on the plan participant or beneficiary to seek precertification; 
as they are neither parties to the plan nor parties to an in-
network provider agreement, there was no corresponding duty 
on out-of-network providers.  McCulloch, 857 F.3d at 150–51, 
151 n.7.  Rather, the provider there, like the Center, “called 
Aetna for [its] own benefit to decide whether [it] would accept 
or reject a potential patient who sought [its] out-of-network 
 
21 Complete preemption is a separate, jurisdictional 
doctrine that in this context arises out of section 502(a).  
Davila, 542 U.S. at 210.  Under this doctrine, if a litigant could 
have brought a cause of action under section 502(a) and if “no 
other independent legal duty . . .  is implicated by [the] 








services,” id. at 151, and the plan “simply provide[d] the 
context for” the out-of-network provider’s claim, id. at 149.   
 
In short, McCulloch, if anything, weighs against express 
preemption here, as does other case law:  The mere fact that a 
claim arises against the factual backdrop of an ERISA plan 
does not mean it makes “reference to” that plan.  See Travelers, 
514 U.S. at 661 (“[P]re-emption does not occur . . . if the state 
law has only a tenuous, remote, or peripheral connection with 
covered plans . . . .” (second alteration in original) (citation 
omitted)); Iola, 700 F.3d at 85 (holding section 514(a) does not 
preempt misrepresentation claims arising out of statements 
made about an ERISA plan prior to the plan’s adoption); 
Dishman v. UNUM Life Ins. Co. of Am., 269 F.3d 974, 983–84 
(9th Cir. 2001) (concluding that state law claims were not 
expressly preempted even though there was “clearly some 
relationship” to an ERISA plan); see also Morris B. Silver 
M.D., Inc. v. Int’l Longshore & Warehouse Union, 206 Cal. 
Rptr. 3d 461, 472 (Ct. App. 2016) (“[T]he fact [that] an ERISA 
plan is an initial step in the causation chain, without more, is 
too remote of a relationship with the covered plan to support a 
finding of preemption.”).   
 
Because the Center’s claims, as pleaded, neither seek 
benefits due under the plans, nor require more than a cursory 
examination of the plans, they do not make impermissible 








2. The Center’s contract and promissory estoppel 
claims do not have a “connection with” ERISA 
plans 
 
State laws have a “connection with” ERISA plans if they 
“govern, or interfere with the uniformity of, plan 
administration,” Gobeille, 136 S. Ct. at 943, or if the “acute, 
albeit indirect, economic effects of the state law force an 
ERISA plan to adopt a certain scheme of substantive coverage 
or effectively restrict its choice of insurers,” id. (internal 
quotation marks and citation omitted).  In making this 
assessment, we consider “the objectives of the ERISA statute 
as a guide to the scope of the state law that Congress 
understood would survive and the nature of the effect of the 
state law on ERISA plans.”  Id. (internal quotation marks and 
citation omitted); accord Menkes, 762 F.3d at 294.  Distilling 
these tests, we and other Courts of Appeals focus primarily on 
whether claims (a) “directly affect the relationship among the 
traditional ERISA entities—the employer, the plan and its 
fiduciaries, and the participants and beneficiaries,” Mem’l 
Hosp., 904 F.2d at 245, 248 (citing Mackey v. Lanier 
Collection Agency & Serv., Inc., 486 U.S. 825, 833 (1988)); 
Access Mediquip, 662 F.3d at 385–86 (same); (b) interfere with 
plan administration, Menkes, 762 F.3d at 295–96; Access 
Mediquip, 662 F.3d at 385; or (c) undercut ERISA’s stated 
purpose, Iola, 700 F.3d at 84–85; Kollman, 487 F.3d at 149.  
As pleaded, it is plausible that the Center’s claims do not 
implicate any of these avenues for an impermissible 








a.  The claims plausibly arise out of a relationship 
that ERISA did not intend to govern 
 
ERISA governs relationships among “the employer, the 
plan and its fiduciaries, and the participants and beneficiaries.”  
Mem’l Hosp., 904 F.2d at 245 (citing Mackey, 486 U.S. at 833); 
accord Access Mediquip, 662 F.3d at 385–86.  As our sister 
circuits have recognized, ERISA struck a “bargain” between 
the interests of participants and beneficiaries on the one hand 
and insurers on the other:  Section 502(a) created federal 
causes of action that allow plan participants and beneficiaries 
to enforce ERISA’s mandates, and section 514(a) limits 
potential sources of plan liability, providing employers and 
plan administrators with some measure of security.  See, e.g., 
Mem’l Hosp., 904 F.2d at 249.   
  
Critically, however, out-of-network healthcare providers 
“were not . . . party to this bargain.”  Id.  Absent the assignment 
of benefits, a healthcare provider may not pursue its own 
section 502(a) cause of action, N. Jersey Brain & Spine Ctr., 
801 F.3d at 372, and section 514(a) works predominately to the 
benefit of insurers, employers, and plan participants by 
reducing compliance and litigation costs and thereby 
increasing the resources employers have to invest in providing 
high-quality plans for their employees, Rush Prudential HMO, 
Inc. v. Moran, 536 U.S. 355, 379 (2002).  Health care providers 
such as the Center orbit the periphery of this bargain, but their 
rights and remedies are not delineated in ERISA’s substantive 
or remedial provisions.   
 
For this reason, the Courts of Appeals have 
overwhelmingly held that claims akin to the Center’s are not 







relationship ERISA did not intend to govern at all.  See Access 
Mediquip, 662 F.3d at 385–86; In Home Health, Inc. v. 
Prudential Ins. Co. of Am., 101 F.3d 600, 605–06 (8th Cir. 
1996); Meadows v. Emp’rs Health Ins., 47 F.3d 1006, 1009–
11 (9th Cir. 1995); Lordmann Enters., Inc. v. Equicor, Inc., 32 
F.3d 1529, 1533–34 (11th Cir. 1994); see also Franciscan 
Skemp Healthcare, Inc. v. Cent. States Joint Bd. Health & 
Welfare Tr. Fund, 538 F.3d 594, 599–601 (7th Cir. 2008) 
(citing this line of cases approvingly); Gerosa v. Savasta & 
Co., 329 F.3d 317, 324 (2d Cir. 2003) (collecting cases).  
Indeed, the only circuit to reach the opposite conclusion is the 
Sixth Circuit in Cromwell v. Equicor-Equitable HCA Corp., 
944 F.2d 1272 (6th Cir. 1991), which has been aptly criticized 
as a “poorly reasoned outlier in the face of the strong trend in 
the bulk of the cases considering healthcare-provider claims,” 
Franciscan Skemp, 538 F.3d at 601.22  The Department of 
Labor, too, has noted the “overwhelming and persuasive 
consensus” that state law claims brought by third-party health 
 
22 The Cromwell majority held that the provider’s state law 
claims were all brought “as grounds for the recovery of benefits 
from the [ERISA] plan for health care services rendered.”  944 
F.2d at 1276 (emphasis added).  But it painted with too broad 
a brush:  While this may have been true for the breach of 
contract and good faith claims that were brought pursuant to an 
assignment of benefits and for breach of the ERISA plan itself, 
it was not for the promissory estoppel and negligent 
misrepresentation claims, where the legal duty allegedly 
breached arose not from the plan but from oral promises made 
by plan administrators and where the healthcare providers were 
seeking damages for reliance upon those promises.  See id. at 








care providers against ERISA plan administrators implicate 
“separate relationship[s]” from those ERISA was intended to 
govern and thus, generally, “are not . . . preempted under 
section 514.”23   
 
We join that consensus today and conclude that the 
relationship between the Center, an out-of-network provider, 
and Aetna, as plan administrator, does not itself create an 
impermissible “connection with” the plans in this case. 
    
 
23 Brief for the Secretary of Labor as Amicus Curiae in 
Support of Plaintiff-Appellant at 23, 25, McCulloch 
Orthopaedic Surgical Servs., PLLC v. United Healthcare Ins. 
Co., No. 15-2144 (2d Cir. Oct. 22, 2015), 
https://www.dol.gov/sol/media/briefs/mcculloch_2015-10-
22.pdf.  While the Secretary’s brief is properly the subject of 
judicial notice, see Vanderklok v. United States, 868 F.3d 189, 
205 n.16 (3d Cir. 2017), it is entitled to only Skidmore 
deference, both because it is a litigation position, Smiley v. E.I. 
Dupont de Nemours & Co., 839 F.3d 325, 329 (3d Cir. 2016), 
and because “[w]e do not defer to an agency’s view concerning 
preemption, but such views . . . are entitled to respect . . . to the 
extent [they] ha[ve] the power to persuade,” Shuker v. Smith & 
Nephew, PLC, 885 F.3d 760, 773 n.11 (3d Cir. 2018) (first and 
second alterations added) (internal quotation marks omitted) 
(quoting Sikkelee v. Precision Airmotive Corp., 822 F.3d 680, 
693–94 (3d Cir. 2016)); see also Skidmore v. Swift & Co., 323 








b.  As pleaded, the claims do not interfere with 
the administration of either plan 
 
Aetna next argues the Center’s claims have a “connection 
with” the plans because litigating those claims would 
impermissibly interfere with plan administration and have 
severe economic consequences for plan coverage and insurer 
choices.  Specifically, Aetna urges us to adopt the view of the 
Fifth Circuit in Access Mediquip, 662 F.3d at 386–87, that 
litigating the provider’s unjust enrichment and quantum meruit 
claims in that case would open the floodgates for any 
healthcare provider to challenge the compensation it receives 
under an ERISA plan.   
 
We decline Aetna’s suggestion because those floodgate 
concerns are inapplicable.  The unjust enrichment and quantum 
meruit claims in Access Mediquip “depend[ed] on [the 
provider’s] assertion that without its services the patients’ 
ERISA plans would have obliged [the insurer] to reimburse a 
different provider for the same services.”  662 F.3d at 378.  
Those claims arose, in other words, not from any independent 
agreement, oral or otherwise, to provide services for payment, 
but from the obligations under the plan.  For that reason, the 
provider sought recovery “only to the extent that the patients’ 
ERISA plans confer on their participants and beneficiaries a 
right to coverage for the services provided.”  Id. at 386 
(emphasis added).  
  
Here, by contrast, the Center’s breach of contract and 
promissory estoppel claims do not allege that J.L.’s and D.W.’s 
plans covered the services at all; instead, the Center alleges that 
Aetna must pay the costs of these services only because, and to 







Silver, 206 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 472 n.16 (2016) (distinguishing 
Access Mediquip on this ground).  The Center’s claims, in 
other words, are much more analogous to the misrepresentation 
claim that the Access Mediquip court held was not preempted 
because it arose out of an obligation independent from the plan.  
662 F.3d at 384–85.  And like that claim, the Center’s claims—
at least on the face of the complaints—would merely result in 
a one-time payment of damages based on the specific 
agreement reached by the parties that does not impermissibly 
interfere with plan administration.  Cf. Iola, 700 F.3d at 85 
(holding that assessing damages against insurers “for pre-plan 
fraud does not affect the administration or calculation of 
benefits” (citation omitted)).  As a result, allowing these claims 
does not impermissibly interfere with plan administration.  Nor 
does it preclude insurers like Aetna (or providers like the 
Center) from minimizing the risk of unanticipated liability by 
formalizing their agreements and thus identifying both the 
particular services to be provided and the dollar amounts to be 
paid (or particular fee schedule to be used) for those services.  
 
What is more, Aetna’s insistence that there will be 
staggering downstream economic effects if these claims are 
allowed to proceed is belied by experience.  For the past thirty 
years, since the Fifth Circuit’s seminal decision in Memorial 
Hospital, our sister circuits have held that claims akin to the 
Center’s are not expressly preempted, and, lo and behold, the 
sky has not fallen.  See, e.g., Access Mediquip, 662 F.3d at 
384–86; In Home Health, 101 F.3d at 604–06; Meadows, 47 
F.3d at 1009–11; Lordmann, 32 F.3d at 1533–34; see also 
Franciscan Skemp, 538 F.3d at 601.  In following suit today, 
we foster the coherence and “uniform[ity]” in ERISA law that 
the Supreme Court has encouraged.  See Gobeille, 136 S. Ct. 








c. Holding the claims preempted at this phase of 
the litigation would undercut ERISA’s 
purposes 
 
In evaluating claims’ “connection with” ERISA plans, the 
Supreme Court has instructed that we must consider “the 
objectives of the ERISA statute as a guide to the scope of the 
state law that Congress understood would survive and the 
nature of the effect of the state law on ERISA plans.”  Gobeille, 
136 S. Ct. at 943 (internal quotation marks and citation 
omitted).  Here, those considerations support the conclusion 
that the Center’s claims, as pleaded, are not preempted. 
 
ERISA’s “principal object” was “to protect plan 
participants and beneficiaries.”  Id. at 946 (quoting Boggs v. 
Boggs, 520 U.S. 833, 845 (1997)); see 29 U.S.C. § 1001(b) 
(highlighting “the interests of participants in employee benefit 
plans and their beneficiaries”).  For those parties, who benefit 
from both ERISA-created rights and ERISA’s civil 
enforcement scheme, it makes good sense that a state law 
remedy that “duplicates, supplements, or supplants” the 
remedies set forth in section 502(a) runs afoul of “clear 
congressional intent to make” those remedies exclusive, 
triggering conflict preemption.  Aetna Health Inc. v. Davila, 
542 U.S. 200, 209 (2004).  The resulting circumscription of 
remedies available to participants and beneficiaries was part 
and parcel of the bargain struck in establishing ERISA’s 
substantive guarantees.   
 
But protection of plan participants and beneficiaries is not 
advanced by extending express preemption to out-of-network 







outlined in section 502(a).  In cases such as D.W.’s, where a 
plan contains an anti-assignment provision, express 
preemption would leave the provider with only one option:  
Sue the patient, hoping that the patient either is willing or able 
to pay significant, unexpected costs or has the interest and 
wherewithal to file suit against the insurer under section 
502(a).24  Neither circumstance, however, is likely to 
compensate the provider for the harm it suffered in reliance on 
the insurer’s promise of payment.  The first will rarely come to 
pass and even more rarely at the full amount to which the 
provider and insurer agreed; the second would be limited in 
any event to the benefits to which the patient was entitled under 
the plan, not the full payment promised by the insurer.  And the 
prospect of suing patients to eventually recover from their 
insurers is unpalatable, to say the least, from a reputational and 
business development standpoint, not to mention the damage it 
would cause to the doctor–patient relationship.  
 
Although Congress has narrowed the universe of remedies 
available to participants and beneficiaries, we will not assume 
 
24 At oral argument, Aetna suggested that insurers might 
allow providers to seek an assignment of benefits 
notwithstanding an anti-assignment provision in the plan.  But 
it cites no authority suggesting this practice is common, let 
alone required; nor does it offer a sound reason for leaving the 
payment of providers’ compensation to the whim of insurers.  
Quite the contrary, as our sister circuits have recognized, and 
as we explore in more detail below, providers will likely 
respond to this uncertainty by either refusing to treat patients 
or imposing barriers to care that will ultimately harm patients.  








that it intended simultaneously to strip healthcare providers, 
such as the Center, of any meaningful remedy, particularly 
where the guidance from the Supreme Court, though limited, 
indicates otherwise.  See Mackey, 486 U.S. at 834 (1988) 
(holding that ERISA does not preempt “state-law methods for 
collecting money judgments . . . [because] otherwise, there 
would be no way to enforce such a judgment won against an 
ERISA plan”).25   
 
Indeed, if anything, that would disserve ERISA’s statutory 
objectives.  To accept Aetna’s argument would be to accept the 
troubling proposition that an out-of-network provider’s right to 
 
25 See also Tr. of the AFTRA Health Fund v. Biondi, 303 
F.3d 765, 782 (7th Cir. 2002) (Because ERISA “does not 
provide any mechanism for plan administrators or fiduciaries 
to recoup monies defrauded from employee benefit trust funds 
by plan participants, garden-variety state-law tort claims must, 
as a general matter, remain undisturbed . . . .”); Gerosa, 329 
F.3d at 329–30 (concluding it is “implausible that Congress 
intended” a result that “would leave [an] affected plan with no 
means for making up its shortfalls”); Hospice of Metro Denver, 
944 F.2d at 755 (reasoning that “if health care providers have 
no recourse under ERISA or under state law, there will be 
reluctance on the part of health care providers to extend care 
without prepayment”); In Home Health, 101 F.3d at 606–07 
(“If providers have no recourse under either ERISA or state 
law . . . , [they] will be understandably reluctant to accept the 
risk of non-payment, and may require up-front payment by 
beneficiaries—or impose other inconveniences—before 
treatment will be offered.” (quoting Mem’l Hosp., 904 F.2d at 








recourse may be bargained away by insurers and plan 
participants in the terms of an ERISA plan to which the 
provider is not a party and which it likely has had no 
opportunity to review before it provides care.  It would in effect 
allow insurers to illegitimately supplement their provider 
network by making promises of payment to induce the 
provision of services, safe in the knowledge that those out of 
network would have no recourse for breach of those promises.  
The consequence, as recognized by other Courts of Appeals, 
would be for providers to begin to require up-front payments 
from patients or to “deny care or raise fees to protect 
themselves against the risk of noncoverage.”  Lordmann, 32 
F.3d at 1533; accord In Home Health, 101 F.3d at 606–07; 
Mem’l Hosp., 904 F.2d at 247–48.  That is a far cry from 
“protect[ing] plan participants and beneficiaries.”  Gobeille, 
136 S. Ct. at 943 (citation omitted).  “[T]he objectives of the 
ERISA statute,” id., thus also indicate the Center’s claims do 
not have an impermissible “connection with” the ERISA plans.    
 
D. The Center’s Unjust Enrichment Claims  
 
We reach the opposite conclusion for the Center’s unjust 
enrichment claims, which we hold do entail an impermissible 
“reference to” the ERISA plans.  
 
To establish a claim of unjust enrichment under New Jersey 
law, the Center must demonstrate that Aetna “received a 
benefit and that retention of that benefit without payment 
would be unjust.”  Thieme v. Aucoine-Thieme, 151 A.3d 545, 
557 (N.J. 2016) (citation omitted).  The Center must also show 
“that it expected remuneration from [Aetna] at the time it 
performed or conferred [that] benefit on [Aetna] and that the 







rights.”  Id. (citation omitted).  No unjust enrichment claim 
may proceed absent a showing of a benefit—indeed, “the basis 
of liability [for an unjust enrichment claim] springs from the 
benefit conferred.”  St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co. v. 
Indemnity Ins. Co. of N. Am., 158 A.2d 825, 827 (N.J. 1960) 
(citation omitted); see Callano v. Oakwood Park Homes Corp., 
219 A.2d 332, 334 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1966). 
 
Given those elements, whether a given unjust enrichment 
claim is preempted may turn on the nature of the benefit:  The 
claim will be preempted if that benefit “is premised on . . . the 
existence of a[n ERISA] plan,” Ingersoll-Rand, 498 U.S. at 
140, or if “the existence of ERISA plans is essential to the 
law’s operation,” Gobeille, 136 S. Ct. at 943 (quoting Cal. Div. 
of Labor Standards Enf’t v. Dillingham Constr., N.A., 519 U.S. 
316, 325 (1997)).  Put differently, if “the court must find . . . 
that an ERISA plan exists,” Ingersoll-Rand, 498 U.S. at 140, 
to establish that element, such that “there simply is no cause of 
action if there is no plan,” id., then “the court’s inquiry must 
be directed to the plan,” and “this . . . cause of action ‘relate[s] 
to’ an ERISA plan,” id. (second alteration in original) (citation 
omitted). 
 
Here, the “benefit conferred” is indeed premised on the 
existence of the plan.  That is because in a case like the 
Center’s, where a healthcare provider claims unjust enrichment 
against an insurer, the benefit conferred, if any,26 is not the 
 
26 We note that district judges in New Jersey have disagreed 
over whether a healthcare provider’s provision of services to 
an insured may ever constitute a “benefit” to an insurer for 
purposes of an unjust enrichment claim.  Compare Plastic 







provision of the healthcare services per se, but rather the 
discharge of the obligation the insurer owes to its insured.  As 
New Jersey’s highest court observed long before the advent of 
ERISA, the essence of an unjust enrichment cause of action 
against an insurer is that “the [insurer] is under a legal duty to 
provide the person injured with medical or surgical 
attendance,” and “the physician . . . dutifully intervene[d] in 
the [insurer’s] affairs and perform[ed] its obligation.”  
Rabinowitz v. Mass. Bonding & Ins. Co., 197 A. 44, 47 (N.J. 
1938) (citation omitted).  And the Center’s own complaint—
describing the benefits at issue as “permitting Aetna to fulfill 
its contractual obligation to D.W. to pay for medically 
 
2019 WL 4750010, at *5–6 (D.N.J. Sept. 30, 2019) 
(concluding that a healthcare provider may not bring an unjust 
enrichment claim against an insurer because the “benefit is 
derived solely by the insured party” (citation omitted)), with 
Demaria v. Horizon Healthcare Servs., Inc., No. 2:11-cv-7298, 
2013 WL 3938973, at *6 (D.N.J. July 31, 2013) (allowing an 
unjust enrichment claim brought by a healthcare provider 
against an insurer to proceed).  Those that have held the benefit 
lies solely with the insured have done so in reliance upon the 
reasoning of Travelrs Indemnity Co. of Connecticut v. Losco 
Group, Inc., 150 F. Supp. 2d 556 (S.D.N.Y. 2001), specifically 
that “[i]t is counterintuitive to say that services provided to an 
insured are also provided to its insurer,” id. at 563.  Travelers 
Indemnity, however, dealt with a claim of quantum meruit, not 
a claim of unjust enrichment, id. at 562, and its reasoning is at 
odds with the decisions of the New Jersey state courts that have 
allowed these types of unjust enrichment claims to proceed.  
See, e.g., Rabinowitz v. Mass. Bonding & Ins. Co., 197 A. 44, 








necessary surgeries,” JA 61, and allowing Aetna to “fulfill[] 
[its] contractual obligation to J.L.,” JA 204—makes plain that 
this is its theory. 
 
What it fails to appreciate, however, is that in the modern 
era, when the insured is a plan participant, the “contractual 
obligation” is none other than the insurer’s duty to its insured 
under the terms of the ERISA plan.  That point was not lost on 
the Fifth Circuit when it distinguished in Access Mediquip 
between the provider’s state law misrepresentation claim—
which was based on a law that “d[id] not purport to regulate 
what benefits [the insurer] provides to the beneficiaries of its 
ERISA plans, but rather what representations it makes to third 
parties about the extent to which it will pay for their services,” 
662 F.3d at 385—and its unjust enrichment claim, for which 
the provider could recover “only to the extent that the patients’ 
ERISA plans confer on their participants and beneficiaries a 
right to coverage for the services provided,”27 id. at 386.  And 
 
27 The Access Mediquip court reached the same conclusion 
as to the provider’s claim of quantum meruit, 662 F.3d at 386–
87, although it is unclear how the analysis would bear out, at 
least with respect to the “reference to” part of the express 
preemption test, under New Jersey law which does not require 
a showing of a benefit conferred to establish a quantum meruit 
claim.  See Starkey, Kelly, Blaney & White v. Estate of 
Nicolaysen, 796 A.2d 238, 242–43 (N.J. 2002) (recovery under 
a quantum meruit claim requires “(1) the performance of 
services in good faith, (2) the acceptance of the services by the 
person to whom they are rendered, (3) an expectation of 
compensation therefor, and (4) the reasonable value of the 








the Eighth, Ninth, Tenth, and Eleventh Circuits likewise have 
recognized that a misrepresentation claim brought by a third-
party healthcare provider, given its legal basis independent of 
the ERISA plan, is not necessarily preempted.  See In Home 
Health, 101 F.3d at 605–07; Meadows, 47 F.3d at 1009–11; 
Hospice of Metro Denver, 944 F.2d at 755–56; Lordmann, 32 
F.3d at 1533–34; cf. Iola, 700 F.3d at 84–85 (holding a 
misrepresentation claim preempted based on statements that 
occurred after the participants had entered into an ERISA plan 
but allowing a misrepresentation claim based on statements 
made before the participants had entered into the plan to 
proceed).  
 
That distinction is no less important here.  To put a fine 
point on it, Aetna’s duties to J.L. and D.W. appear to arise 
specifically from plan provisions stating that “[i]f Aetna refers 
[the insured] to a Non-Network provider, the service or supply 
shall be covered as a network service or supply,” JA 108 
(D.W.’s plan); accord JA 248 (J.L.’s plan) (similar), and that 
“Aetna is fully responsible for payment to the health care 
professional and the [insured]’s liability shall be limited to any 
applicable Network Copayment, Coinsurance or Deductible 
for the service or supply,” JA 108; accord JA 248 (similar).  
Thus, unlike the Center’s claims of breach of contract or 
promissory estoppel, which seek to enforce a promise of 
payment independent of any plan-based obligation, see supra 
at pages 16–35, its unjust enrichment claims require “the court 
[to] find . . . that an ERISA plan exists,” Ingersoll-Rand, 498 
U.S. at 140, in order to demonstrate that Aetna “received a 
benefit”—i.e., the discharge of its duties under that plan—“and 
that retention of that benefit without payment would be 
unjust,” Thieme, 151 A.3d at 557 (citation omitted).  Likewise, 







is no cause of action [for unjust enrichment] if there is no plan.”  
Ingersoll-Rand, 498 U.S. at 140.  This claim is thus squarely 
preempted by section 514(a).   
 
*          *          * 
 
ERISA is a “comprehensive and reticulated statute,” Mass. 
Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Russell, 473 U.S. 134, 146 (1985) (citation 
omitted), but its complexity does not relieve us of our duty to 
carefully assess the parameters of the claims before us to 
determine whether they “relate to” ERISA plans.  Although 
section 514(a) is robust, Menkes, 762 F.3d at 293, it is not all 
encompassing, Gobeille, 136 S. Ct. at 943.  Because the Center 
plausibly alleged breach of contract and promissory estoppel 
claims that do not contain an impermissible “reference to” or 
“connection with” ERISA plans, the District Court erred in 
dismissing those claims as preempted at this stage of the 
litigation,28 even as it properly dismissed the unjust enrichment 
claims as preempted.  
 
28 Because the District Court denied the Center’s motion to 
file a second amended complaint in D.W.’s case based on an 
erroneous application of express preemption that ruling too 
must give way.  We review a denial of a motion to amend for 
abuse of discretion, Menkes, 762 F.3d at 290, except where, as 
here, “amendment is denied for legal reasons drawing de novo 
review,” Mullin v. Balicki, 875 F.3d 140, 150 (3d Cir. 2017) 
(emphasis omitted).  Aetna argues that we should affirm the 
District Court’s denial of the motion to amend, at least as to the 
Center’s breach of contract claim, because the Center failed to 
state a claim.  In support of this argument, it points to a line 
from the District Court’s opinion stating that the Center “does 










For the foregoing reasons, we will affirm in part and reverse 
in part and remand to the District Court for further proceedings 
consistent with this opinion.  
 
JA 25.  But it appears the District Court was assessing only the 
precertification letter.  Under New Jersey law, “absent a statute 
to the contrary, an oral offer and acceptance constitutes a 
binding agreement,” Williams v. Vito, 838 A.2d 556, 560 (N.J. 
Super. Ct. Law. Div. 2003); cf. N.J. Stat. Ann. 25:1-5 
(identifying the limited circumstances that trigger New 
Jersey’s statute of frauds), and Aetna’s payment of a good 
portion of both J.L.’s and D.W.’s surgeries indicates that it, 
too, recognized the existence of some agreement with the 
Center.  
